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Teach me to number my days aright, that I may gain wisdom of heart.
-Psalm 90 :12
The Epicurean Dilemma
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If one were to ask us point-blank, and indeed somewhat crudely,
why we get all "hung up" about death - the death of our loved ones
or our own eventual death - we might well want to respond with
indignation. We might take the question more as a challenge and outright effrontery to our human sensibilities than as a serious query. We
would rightly be aghast at the apparent flippancy of the inquirer or
provocateur, as you may have it, in face of the evident human happening and sorrowful parting that is death. It isn't that we would favor or
sustain a morbid preoccupation about death, but simply that we
would beg to demand that rudimentary sensitivity and common
decency prevail whenever this awesome and, for some, dreadful aspect
of life's inevitable end comes to the fore.
Conversely, we cannot lightly dismiss the dilemma entailed in
Epicurus's classic sophism mocking human concern for the moribund
and his fate. To quote Epicurus: "The most terrible evil, death, does
not touch me. Indeed when we are, death is not, and when death is,
we are not. " In other words, for Epicurus, death is truly a nonproblem
which does not merit man's excessive anxiety. To be so, to the mind
of Epicurus, only promotes a species of escapism from the real challenges of life and, therefore, human inauthenticity, a line of reasoning
taken up in our own time by the French existentialist, Jean-Paul
Sartre.1
But if Epicureanism has had its ready followers, it has also had its
dauntless opponents. In an entirely opposing point of view, one of
these dissenters, the stoic, Cicero, envisages the fundamental task of
all true philosophy as nothing more than a commentatio mortis. 2 In
this perspective, the phenomenon of death is approached as the
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sobering experience of reality, and is afforded the central place in all
reflection on the human condition. Unless a meaning can truly be
found for it, life itself is little more than a " useless passion," to use
Sartre's famous expression .
With this divergence of views on the role ahd importance of death
in life, it is obvious that the first-order duty of philosophy is to
determine which position is the correct one - the Epicurean or the
Ciceronean. And to do this, philosophy must remain faithful to its
own proper methods. As a discipline seeking ultimate reasons for
things, it must remember that these are reasons, or better yet, meanings, for man, that they have bearing and significance only for him .
Thus, heeding Gabriel Marcel, philosophy must make man and, more
specifically, the self its point of departure and central point of
reference. This fact that philosophy gravitates around man discloses to
us that essentially it concerns far more than the problematical order of
impassive, neutral objectivity before reality, but is rather of the metaproblematical order insofar as it entails a necessarily subjective dimension in the sense of having bearing only, and uniquely, for man, the
experiencing, knowing and affirming subject. As such, philosophy
must go beyond the mere exercise of empirical objectivity " from without, " as it were, and a mere transsubjective analysis of objects, and
must concern itself more profoundly with grasping its objects " from
within," thereby engaging in true, reflective analysis which seeks to
recoup the lost meanings and unities given in original experience
before the neu tral dissection of reality by the particular sciences.
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Man Before Death
When we consider man vis-a,-vis the phenomenon of death, we are
immediately confronted with two enigmas, that of man and of death
itself. Man is a riddle to himself, because he can never turn his eyes on
himself and grasp himself in the same manner as he perceives the
objects in the world before him . One is even prone to ask: Is there,
indeed, such a thing or separate substance as a "self" at all? David
Hume, the most famous sceptic of modern times, answers
unequivocally in the negative. In his pursuit of this elusive " self," he
finds only individual perceptions and accordingly, reduces that self to
nothing more than a " bundle or collection of different perceptions." 3 To such a nonsubstantial self, lacking all internal consistency
and real perdurance in time, death can obviously pose no real existential difficulties, and indeed, cannot even be consistently raised as a
problem at all. Of course, Hume was wrong, because he failed to note
that the " self" cannot be grasped over and above or apart from its
perceptions, and it is precisely in them that it is given as an immediate
datum of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem of personal
identity, especially as it relates to death, does not dissolve as Hume
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thought it should and, on the contrary, retains its full, problematic
character and poignant relevancy.
No less enigmatic is that "single expressionless syllable," as Hegel
would have it, 4 that is death. At first sight, it may appear to be given
to the senses for empirical grasp unlike the self. But upon closer
scrutiny we see this is not at all the case. True, we may witness a
person dying, indeed see him die, but do we see death? And even in
such an instance as this, are we really capable of pinpointing the actual
moment of death, at least in any rigorous, scientific sense? If we can,
how is it that there seems to be no end to the debate among scientists
and medical personnel as to what exactly constitutes clinical death?
Empirically speaking, medicine has traditionally known four atria
mortis - the brain, heart, lungs, and blood - but these, in the last
analysis, turn out to be only certain approximations to the reality of
physical death and not a full conceptual grasping of it. 5 Even if we
allow, for argument's sake, that empirical study does offer a certain
conceptualization of death, we still do not arrive at a truly existential
appreciation and understanding of it. It is indeed precisely at this
particular juncture that we find ourselves up against an impasse, an
unintelligible gap, to be exact. I experience the death of others, but
until I, myself die, I do not experience the act of dying, which alone
discloses to me what death -is at root. For this reason, vapors of
mystery always hover about death and those vapors are not capable of
intelligible distillation and residual isolation .
We would underestimate the real import of the experience of death
we are given in life, short of our own death, were we to state that we
can extract from it only an inductive certitude that we, along with all
others, shall die. Furthermore, we would seriously fall short of the
mark if our intellectual concerting with death were to end with a
resignation of spirit before the ultimate indefinability of death . The
definition is, after all, not the climax of philosophic activity. In truth,
the experience of the death of "the other" is more than a m erely
empirical, clinical datum. The loss of the other in death is, in a most
profound way, also a personal loss for me . Life is essehtially a "beingwith" and, for this reason, the death of another entails the real,
painful loss of part of my personal self in that this other, in his
personhood, helped to constitute my own personality and really determine me as a person. 6 In other words, apart from him, I am not, in a
very real sense, the same person as before.
The Syllogism of Ivan Ilych
The fundamental tension existing before the empirical face, as it
were, of death, on the one hand, and its existential, internal dynamics,
on the other, can be otherwise formulated in a dialectic between the
personal and impersonal dimensions of man's contingent existence.
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This very conflict, which is nothing but a concretization of the enigma
of man before death, is uniquely captured in the syllogism of Ivan
Ilych, as found in Leo Tolstoy's dramatic soliloquy, Smert' Ivana
Il'icha (The Death of Ivan Ilych). In a deathbed meditation, the
terminally-ill Ilych recalls a classic syllogism learned while still a lad in
school. "Caius is a man. Men are mortal. Therefore Caius is mortal. "
Formally speaking, the reasoning is impeccable. But, materially speaking, when it is applied to himself, Ilych is only troubled by its dissonant ring . "Yes, it is true of Caius, who is only man in general; Caius is
mortal, and it is just that he die. But me, Vanja, Ivan Ilych with all my
feelings and thoughts, for me it is another matter ... All this cannot
be - but it is!" 7
The case of Ivan Ilych is so typical of life, that one easily identifies
and commiserates with him. People often can face the reality of death
as long as it is not their own. But when it is about to touch them , they
are at a loss for words, and are more than willing to flee from it, and
defy its signals. St. Paul's ominous words that death comes " like a
thief in the night" (1 Thes 5 :2) reverberates a sobering, axiomatic
truth: mars certa, hora incerta. 8 But the apostle intimates an even
more important truth about death here. Death is problematical only
when it is seen to affect my existence. Similarly, when Ben Sira
admonishes us, "for him it (death) was yesterday, for you today"
(Sirach 38:22), he refers to more than just the hour of death. More
importantly, he insinuates that it will visit us personally. As a blunt
fact of life, death is entirely anonymous and impersonal. We begin to
shudder before it only upon perceiving its eminent, personal character.
But for many, like Ivan Ilych, this prise de conscience comes only, if
even then, on the threshold of death.

,

The Paradox of Death
The knowledge that we are destined to die, that our terrestrial
existence will one day end, carries more than epistemological import.
More radically, we stand before an existential fact of life that signs our
very beings at their depths. We are, indeed, as Heidegger has rightly
insisted, "beings-for-death," with the clear, logical implication that we
must consciously live out this truth of our nature and existence, if we
are to lead genuinely authentic existences. 9 Therefore, the question
we must constantly bear in mind and candidly ask ourselves is, paradoxical as it may seem: How must I live my death? How must I decide
my existence in view of the fact that I am a being-for-death?
The paradox of death reveals a notable ambivalence . Death as a
privation of life is a negative phenomenon. It is an outright evil. But
the condition of the possibility of this evil is life, a positive good. I
may be a "being-for-death," but my potentiality for death is only a
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concomitance of the actuality of my existence in life, i.e., of my being
alive. That I can die, that I have the potency for death, oddly enough,
highlights a facet of my living. If this potency is, accordingly, truly
integrated into my lived existence, a basic negativity is transformed
into a positivity, and thus what was once a mere privation can serve as
the surest means to recapitulate a life. Ironically, that which is the
deprivation of life is what can give real consistency to life.
This profound truth is the thought underlying the psalmist's prayer
of petition: "Teach us to number our days aright, that we may gain
wisdom of heart." Unless we have learned to face death already in life,
unless we have succeeded in patterning our life in view of eventual
death and, making our life-decisions against the backdrop of death,
our life is deprived of the crucial anchoring point which alone can
keep it on the straight and narrow path to meaningful existence.
The commitment to life has intelligibility only if prior, considered
attention has been afforded death. Real authenticity cannot accrue to
my life-decisions if the subject of death has been left out of my
decision-making process. And, indeed, unless my life is paradoxically
formed, as it were, in death, the particular events in my life cannot be
annealed into a real, personal history, but remain merely the sporadic,
atomized events of a rambling chronicle.
The Good Death
A classic epitaph reads : Cogita mori u t discas vivere (Think about
death and learn to live) . This sound advice, which takes heed of the
psalmist, aptly sums up the life-death dialectic undergirding man's
project of self-realization in time. If human existence as such, however, cannot be fully understood and appraised apart from a consideration of life's being . indelibly signed by death, how much more meaning and value must life's last moments take on, those final days before
human existence's ultimate appointment with destiny in time? This
being the case, how could knowing that life's end is imminent not be
anything else than a grace, a blessed opportunity for ultimate summations, reconcilations, and reawakenings of the spirit? In truth, a " good
death" would seem then not to consist in a tranquil death as such or in
an unconscious death in sleep, but rather in the precise knowledge
that death is approaching. A good death might entail suffering, but it
need not. Its specificity at any rate consists in the knowledge that
death is approaching and in the conscientious preparation of oneself
for this moment of stark reality and naked truth.
Ivan Ilych, for one, died a good death. After having struggled
wearily through the characteristic, psychological stages of death
- those of denial, revolt, and acceptance - he was prepared to meet
his Maker. Ironically, it was only when he was set to die that he
realized he could really begin to live. Until that moment his life was
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entirely conventional, lacking depth and dramatic timbre. It was owing
precisely to this superficiality and triteness of existence that he could
not bear the thought of death. What had he really accomplished? What
serious thought had he ever entertained during the course of his life?
Did he ever really live qua man? Or had he only existed from day to
day, much like the brute animal?
It was not facing death that terrorized Ivan Ilych. It was knowing
that he had wasted his time and energy in nonmomentous activity and
vain banalities. Were all his hopes for a truly meaningful existence
forever to be blighted? In true accord with the paradoxical character
of death, this was not to be the case. The frank admission that he had
not lived his life as he should have gave him an unfamiliar and most
unexpected strength and freedom before death. His previously
amorphous existence now enjoyed an unprecedented consistency,
which not only offered a sorely needed source of consolation, but also
fortified him to confront the ultimate challenge lying before him. So
armed, he could now join in chorus with Simeon, and exclaim: "Nunc
dimittis . .. " (Lk 2:29-32). His death thus became a victory of life,
and the poignant words of the joyful Byzantine Easter hymn, " ... by
death he conquered death," referring to Christ, could be properly
applied to Ilych.
The Refutation of Epicurus
Pondering what has hitherto been said in this meditation on the
reality of death and its place in man's life, it appears that one central
thought has been defended and developed, namely, that the ultimate
paradox of death is nothing other than the invincibility of life. This
insight, however, needs add~tional clarification and elaboration if it is
to be fully intelligible. What has been captured artistically by Leo
Tolstoy in the character of Ivan Ilych now needs to be ~hilosophically
articulated. To be fully adequate and convincing, this philosophic
understanding must be able to dissolve the riddle contained in
Epicurus's scoffing presentation of the problematic or else it will fail
to counteract, let alone subjugate, the cynical attitude conditioning it.
Italian philosopher Michele Federico Sciacca, in his minor classic,
Marte e Immortalita' (Death and Immortality) isolates Epicurus's
fundamental error in his failure to distinguish the state of death from
the act of dying. 10 The state of death is a mere datum for blunt,
empirical observation. As such, it does not formally enjoy any special,
intrinsic intelligibility, and is a merely neutral phenomenon, common
to all organic life, be it vegetative, sensitive or rational, beyond the
sphere of value and existential meaning. However, if one considers the
ac t of dying, the fact that I, a human person, die, our formal standpoint essentially changes. My death as such, insofar as it is my act and
my personal experience, can never be the object of the blunt observa278
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tion of another. He can never enter into me, and experience what I
experience. But it is exclusively on this formal level that one can
penetrate the real, Quman meaning of death, and discover its true
import for life.
"He is dead" is an observable fact for anyone who cares to look, but
"I am dead" is a contradictory proposition. l l The one makes sense;
the other is devoid of meaning . In the why and wherefore of any
determinate, personal act of dying, one sees the pledge of life. It is,
therefore, not death but life that has the last, decisive word, whence
follows Sciacca's classic enthymeme in "Eureka" ; "I die , therefore, I am
immortal." 12 A "proof" of immortality in epigrammatical form! As
the one who dies, it is I who can personally accept it, and hence
integrate it into my future. Acc ordingly, death can enter into the sway
of my personal decision. Since it is I who die, since it is my last
personal act of terrestrial life, it is equally my last spiritual act of
transcendence over matter in time. It is my life's transcendence and
valiant victory over death. Yes, I die, but that "I" is oblivious to
death. Dying foreshadows not the end, but a beginning. It bespeaks not
irreversible disintegration, but eternity and immortality.
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